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Abstract
We describe an extension to the AJPF agent program model-checker so that it may be used to
generate models for input into other, non-agent, model-checkers. We motivate this adaptation,
arguing that it potentially improves the efficiency of the model-checking process and provides
access to richer property specification languages. We illustrate the approach by describing the
export of AJPF program models to both the SPIN and PRISM model-checkers. We also inves-
tigate, experimentally, the effect the process has on the overall efficiency of model-checking.
Keywords: Model checking, BDI agent programming, AJPF, SPIN, PRISM.
1 Introduction
Agent Java Pathfinder (AJPF) [7] is a model-checker for programs written in a range
of Belief–Desire–Intention (BDI) agent programming languages. It is built on top of
Java Pathfinder (JPF), an explicit state program model-checker for Java programs [29],
and exhaustively checks the execution of Java-based interpreters for BDI languages.
AJPF has a property specification language based upon Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
extended with descriptions of beliefs, intentions, etc.
AJPF (and JPF) are “program” model-checkers, meaning that they work directly
on the program code, rather than on a mathematical model of the program’s execution
(as is typical for standard model-checking). Using a program model-checker gives
the advantage that results derived apply directly to the program under consideration
without the need for an intermediate stage. However, such program model-checkers
utilise symbolic execution to internally build a model to be analysed and, consequently,
AJPF is slow when compared to traditional model-checkers. It is typically the internal
generation of the program model (created by executing all possible paths through the
Java program) that causes a significant bottleneck.
Hunter et al. [16] suggested alleviating this by using JPF to generate models of
agent programs that could then be checked in other model-checkers. The goal of this
paper is to expand upon this idea showing how AJPF can be adapted to output models
in the input languages of both SPIN and PRISM tools. Model generation remains slow,
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and it is unclear that efficiency improves on individual runs, though there will be gains
if one model is reused several times to check different properties. More importantly,
such translations give access to a wider range of property specification languages. Con-
sequently, AJPF can be used as an automated link between programs written in BDI
languages and a range of model-checkers appropriate for verifying properties of those
programs.
We are particularly interested in applying program model-checking to the verifi-
cation of hybrid systems in which a BDI agent program controls a physical system
consisting of sensors, actuators and control systems [9]. Such systems necessarily in-
volve probabilistic information about sensor and actuator reliability and the end results
of verification are therefore theorems involving probabilities. For instance we have
been considering the verification of a robot-to-human handover task in which a robot
has to pass a table leg to a person (see, e.g., [11]). When the person gets the table leg
they will fix it to the table top. The end goal is for the robot and human to work together
to manufacture a complete table. In order for the robot to let go of the table leg, it must
be sure the person is ready to take hold of the leg, otherwise the leg could be dropped (it
determines this using several factors such as the the person’s gaze, and the location of
their hand). Given probabilistic information about the behaviour of people and sensors
involved in the task we would like to be able to formally verify (or formally discover)
properties such as the following:
• What is the probability that eventually the robot will drop some object such as
the table leg?
• What is the probability that eventually the leg will be fixed to the table?
The key advantages of the approach outlined in this paper are potential improvements
in the efficiency and scope of model checking, and access to a richer set of logics for
specifying program properties.
2 Background
2.1 AJPF
Java PathFinder (JPF) is an explicit state model-checker for Java programs [29]. It is
a program model-checker, meaning that it takes as input an executable Java program
rather than a model of a Java program and then exhaustively explores all possible ex-
ecution paths through this program to ensure that some property holds. For example,
using JPF, it is possible to explore all possible thread scheduling options for a multi-
threaded program to ensure that deadlock between threads never occurs.
AJPF [7] is, in turn, a program model-checker built on top of JPF. AJPF is spe-
cially designed for model-checking programs for agents that use the BDI paradigm
(see [31]) and whose execution can be described in terms of rational, goal-directed
behaviour. AJPF extends JPF with a linear temporal logic (LTL) model-checking
algorithm based on [4, 10]1. Crucially, the property specification language contains
1JPF does not currently support LTL model-checking, focusing instead on searching for deadlocks and
exception freedom. Work is currently in progress to re-integrate this support.
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shallow modalities for agent concepts such as belief (B), goal (G), intention (I), etc.,
as well as the standard LTL modalities ♦ (eventually) and  (always)2. The BDI agent
concepts [26] are mapped to specific data structures in the Java program, allowing
properties such as the following to be verified:
♦Ba reached(destination)
This property states that it is always the case that, eventually, agent a believes it has
reached its destination. AJPF is intended for use with BDI agent programming lan-
guages which have an explicit operational semantics. This operational semantics is
implemented in the Agent Infrastructure Layer (AIL), a set of Java classes support-
ing AJPF and allowing the rapid construction of interpreters for BDI agent program-
ming languages [7]. The AIL also provides support for the Belief, Goal and Intention
modalities used by the formal property specification language. This language is dis-
cussed more fully in [7] and summarised in Appendix A. Note, crucially, that temporal
operators cannot be nested within the belief, goal and intention operators.
There are two key (and related) advantages to using a program model-checker such
as AJPF instead of one with a specialised modelling language for input. Firstly, this
approach avoids the need for the programmer (or designer) to create a separate model of
the implementation for verification purposes. Secondly, in cases where certification of
the program is required (e.g., [30]), this approach increases the value of the evidence
submitted to the certification authority since it provides direct information about the
system that will be deployed, rather than some idealised model.
These advantages come at a cost. The main disadvantage of program model-
checking, particularly in AJPF, is that it is very slow in comparison with existing
specialised model-checkers such as SPIN [15]. This has been (and continues to be)
mitigated through updates to AJPF which have decreased the time taken for model-
checking. However, the fact remains that programs tend to be more complex than
models of programs and this causes program model-checking to be slower3. Typically,
to verify a program using AJPF requires minutes, hours or even days in extreme cases.
AIL provides a framework for implementing a wide range of well-known agent
programming languages (e.g., GOAL [14]). Typically, agent programming languages
are separate from the interpreters generally associated with those languages. Since
different interpreters will use the same operational semantics, choosing an AIL-based
interpreter instead of the standard interpreter should be similar to choosing between dif-
ferent C compilers. An AIL interpreter can be preferred, therefore, where certification
is an issue. In practice, the standard interpreters are often more efficient, user-friendly
and up-to-date.
One issue to consider is whether it is preferable to use just JPF to verify agent
programs given that most standard interpreters are written in Java. This approach is
certainly feasible, although the interpreters would likely need significant modification
2The next operator ‘©’ was omitted partly because it is not always simple to determine the correct
semantics for “next step” in a BDI program execution and partly because its omission simplifies the model
checking algorithm.
3This is to be expected, since AJPF combines explicit-state representation with the use of symbolic
execution to explore the possible behaviours.
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to work with JPF. For example, adaptations would be needed to access the AJPF Prop-
erty Specification Language (or create something similar). Also, in order to minimize
the state space explored by JPF careful use of Java data structures is necessary (e.g.,
all sets must be stored in a canonical form for state matching).
2.2 SPIN
SPIN [15] is a popular model-checking tool originally developed by Bell Laboratories
in the 1980s. It has been in continuous development for over thirty years and is widely
used in both industry and academia (e.g., [13, 18, 19]). SPIN uses an input language
called PROMELA. Typically a model of a program and the property (as a “never claim”
— an automaton describing executions that violate the property) are both provided in
PROMELA, but SPIN also provides tools to convert formulae written in LTL into never
claims for use with the model-checker. SPIN works by automatically generating pro-
grams written in C which carry out the exploration of the model relative to an LTL
property. SPIN’s use of compiled C code makes it very quick in terms of execution
time, and this is further enhanced through other techniques such as partial order reduc-
tion. In this paper we use SPIN version 6.2.3 (24 October 2012).
2.3 PRISM
PRISM [20] is a probabilistic symbolic model-checker in continuous development since
1999, primarily at the Universities of Birmingham and Oxford. PRISM provides broadly
similar functionality to SPIN but also allows for the model-checking of probabilistic
models, i.e., models whose behaviour can vary depending on probabilities represented
in the model. Developers can use PRISM to create a probabilistic model (written in
the PRISM language) which can then be model-checked using PRISM’s own proba-
bilistic property specification language, which subsumes several well-known proba-
bilistic logics including PCTL, probabilistic LTL, CTL, and PCTL*. PRISM has been
used to formally verify a variety of systems in which reliability and uncertainty play a
role, including communication protocols, cryptographic protocols and biological sys-
tems [25]. In this paper we use PRISM version 4.1.beta2.
2.4 Related Work
As mentioned in the introduction, Hunter et al. [16] first suggested using JPF to gener-
ate models of programs that could then be used with alternative model-checkers. Their
work targets the Brahms [27] agent programming language. They implemented a sim-
ulator for Brahms in Java and used JPF to produce a PROMELA model of a Brahms
program. They used this system to investigate examples in air traffic control and health-
care and demonstrated that it is feasible to use JPF as a model building tool. Their work
did not, however, directly address the key BDI concepts of beliefs, intentions, etc., and
it was a customised tool specifically aimed at the verification of Brahms programs.
Their tool also contains support for the export of models to PRISM and NuSMV. In
theory the framework can be applied to any multi-agent system, not just those imple-
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Figure 1: The operation of AJPF wrt. the two Java Virtual Machines
mented in Brahms, though no explicit support exists for adapting systems for such use
in a generic way.
The work here takes the ideas from Hunter et al. [16] as a starting point and aims
to use them within AJPF’s more generic framework in order to provide a general open
source tool in which BDI programs can be verified in a range of model-checkers and
which allows BDI concepts such as beliefs and goals to be easily and explicitly referred
to as part of the specification of properties in a range of input languages.
This work is an extension of a previous workshop paper by the same authors [6].
In this paper we provide more details of the implementation. In particular this paper
describes further work with the PRISM model checker which adds a new case study
and discusses the time and memory resources used during verification.
3 Generating Program Models Using AJPF
JPF is implemented via a specialised Java virtual machine which stores, among other
things, backtracking points. This allows the program model-checking algorithm to ex-
plore the entire execution space of a Java program. It is highly customisable, providing
numerous hooks for Java Listeners that monitor and control the progress of model-
checking. In what follows we will refer to the specialised Java virtual machine used
by JPF as the JPFJVM. JPF is implemented in Java itself, therefore the JPFJVM is a
program that executes in some underlying native Java virtual machine. We refer to this
native virtual machine as NatJVM. Listeners execute in the NatJVM.
AJPF’s checking process is constructed using a JPF Listener. As JPF executes, it
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labels each state explored by the JPFJVM with a unique number. The AJPF Listener
tracks these numbers as well as the transitions between them and uses this information
to construct a Kripke structure in the NatJVM. The LTL model-checking algorithm is
then executed on this Kripke structure. This is partly for reasons of efficiency (the
NatJVM naturally executes much faster than the JPFJVM) and also to account for
the need for LTL to explore states in the model several times if the model contains
a looping path and an until expression (e.g., true U p) exists in the LTL4 property
(see [4] and [10] for details).
In order to determine whether the agents have particular beliefs, goals, etc., it is
necessary for the LTL model-checking algorithm to have access to these. However,
these structures exist in the JPFJVM not the NatJVM and so techniques (described in
detail below) are required to create objects that represent propositions of interest (e.g.,
“agent 1 believes the formation is a square”) in the JPFJVM, and then track these from
the NatJVM in order to label the states in the Kripke structure appropriately.
The process of adapting this system to produce a model for use with an alterna-
tive model checker involves: (i) bypassing the LTL model-checking algorithm within
AJPF5 but continuing to generate and maintain a set of propositional objects in order
to label states in the Kripke structure, and (ii) exporting the Kripke structure in a format
that can subsequently be used by another model checker.
At the start of a model-checking run AJPF analyses the property being verified in
order to produce a list of logical propositions that are needed for checking that property
(e.g., agent 1 believes it has reached its destination, agent 2 intends to win the auction
etc.). AJPF then creates objects representing each of these propositions in both the
JPFJVM and NatJVM. In the JPFJVM these propositional objects can access the state
of the multi-agent system and explicitly check that the relevant propositions hold (e.g.,
that the Java object representing agent 1 contains, in its belief set, an object representing
the formula reached(destination)).
In detail, the system maintains three different types of objects representing non-
temporal propositions, one in the NatJVM (native propositions) and two in the JPFJVM
(abstract and concrete propositions). It is not strictly necessary to maintain two in the
JPFJVM but the details of how the three different types of proposition are created
during parsing means that abstract propositions are created first (in both JVMs) and
linked by storing a reference to the JPFJVM version in the NatJVM. Once that is done,
native propositions are created from the abstract propositions in the NatJVM while
concrete propositions are created from them in the JPFJVM.
When the NatJVM accesses an object in the JPFJVM using a reference (as the
native propositions access their corresponding abstract propositions), inspecting the
values of its fields is straightforward providing they contain values of a primitive data
type (such as bool or int). This is achieved using JPF’s Model Java Interface (MJI)
interface [17]. The implementation is available via AJPF’s SourceForge distribution6.
In the JPFJVM the concrete propositions have methods for checking their truth
against the current agent system. These concrete propositions update a Boolean field
4“aUp” means that “a is true continuously until b becomes true”; see Appendix D.
5This is not strictly necessary but it increases the speed of model generation, and avoids the pruning of
some model states based on the property under consideration.
6http://mcapl.sourceforge.net
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in their corresponding abstract proposition whenever their own truth is checked.
In the NatJVM a Bu¨chi Automaton is constructed from the property. This is the
finite-state automaton that will be used for checking the truth of the property during
model-checking. When checking the truth value of an individual state in the Bu¨chi
Automaton, at a particular point in an execution, only the truth value of propositions
are checked. Evaluating the truth of temporal properties associated with the state is
deferred for further exploration of the automaton. Therefore each Bu¨chi state maintains
a list of native proposition objects, and, when the truth of the state is checked these
consult the fields of their corresponding object in the JPFJVM.
Each time the interpreter for the agent programming language executes one step7,
all of the concrete proposition objects check their truth and update the truth value field
in the abstract propositions. Precisely when this occurs is the choice of the interpreter
designer. It is typically either each time a transition is made in the operational seman-
tics, or each time a full reasoning cycle in the operational semantics completes.
Properties in the NatJVM are updated whenever JPF determines that a transition has
been made in the program running in the JPFJVM. When used in conjunction with par-
tial order reduction JPF typically detects a transition when there is a scheduling choice
between agents (and possibly the environment) or branching caused by the invocation
of some random choice. It is at this point, therefore, that the Native-level proposition
objects examine the relevant fields in the abstract objects stored in the JPFJVM and
update their own fields. This process is illustrated informally in Figure 2.
3.1 Advantages
Ideally, a program is only model-checked once against a full set of requirements con-
sisting of a conjunction of many properties. However, it is our experience that it is more
common to check programs several times against smaller properties. For AJPF, this
results in the program model being generated from the Java bytecode multiple times,
once for each property. Our experiences with AJPF suggested that the most compu-
tationally complex part of the model-checking was in the generation of this program
model, and that this was the chief cause of the slow performance of AJPF compared
with other model-checkers. (This is unsurprising since, in AJPF, the generation of
a transition in the program model can involve the symbolic execution of significant
amounts of Java bytecode.)
The first advantage of the approach described here, therefore, is that exporting the
program model prior to model-checking allows us to generate the program model only
once, and thereafter we can use the far more compact Kripke structure representation,
meaning that the time to model-check each property is reduced (on average).
The second advantage is that other model-checkers (such as SPIN) have many
years of development invested in an accurate and efficient implementation of LTL
model-checking. Compared to these, there is a much weaker level of assurance that
the LTL model-checking implemented in AJPF is correct (although it has been tested
against well-known pitfalls). Also, the AJPF LTL model-checking algorithm is not
7The meaning of a “step” in the semantics — as in the next point of interest to verification — is deter-
mined by the person implementing the semantics. Typically this is either the application of a single rule from
the semantics, or of a whole reasoning cycle. This issue is discussed further in [7].
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highly optimised, being a direct adaptation of the algorithms in [4, 10]. Consequently,
it is desirable, for reasons of confidence and efficiency, to use a more well-developed
implementation of model-checking (such as SPIN) where possible.
The third advantage is that this technique will allow us to use richer specification
languages than LTL. For instance when verifying hybrid systems, probabilistic values
frequently appear both in terms of the reliability of sensors, and the chance that an
external action will achieve its expected outcome. Exporting an AJPF program model
into a probabilistic model-checker such as PRISM will allow us to verify properties
stated in more expressive logics, such as probabilistic computation tree logic (PCTL).
3.2 Disadvantages
While there are advantages to using AJPF just for model generation, there are clearly
some disadvantages as well.
Firstly, it is arguable that the direct link between the implemented program and
the system being verified described in Section 2.1 has been lost. However, the LTL
model-checking algorithm used in AJPF was already operating upon an automatically-
generated abstraction of the system stored in the NatJVM. Taking this abstracted model
and exporting it to a different system does not, in our view, have a significant effect on
the overall correctness of any verification result. However it has introduced a further
step into the process which could cause an issue with software certification concerning
tool qualification. Specifically, we have introduced another tool (SPIN) to the exist-
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ing verification system (AJPF) which would mean that both tools would now need to
be qualified separately, and possibly again as a combined tool, with additional asso-
ciated costs (tool qualification can be very costly in terms of time and finance). We
do, nevertheless, provide a fully automatic route from implemented code, through an
abstraction of that code, to a formal verification result, which itself is preferable to
systems in which the abstraction from the implementation must be done “by hand.”
Secondly, the opportunity to exploit features of the property under test in order
to prune model-checking has been lost. In particular, when checking liveness prop-
erties (of the form “eventually p will happen”, or ♦p) it is possible to prune the LTL
model-checking search tree as soon as p occurs. It would obviously still be possible
to do this, if the user were confident that only this property will be checked on the
resulting model. Where the model may be used to check a number of properties such
pruning is no longer a possibility and the entire program state space must be explored.
Similarly, although we have not yet explored techniques such as property-based slic-
ing [3] in AJPF, these would also be difficult to exploit if a full model were to be
exported. However, it is likely that, in many cases where there are several properties to
be checked, the additional time taken to produce a complete model will be offset by the
time saved in not having to reproduce this model each time a new property needs to be
verified. Similarly, the fact that we export the model as a Kripke structure means that
we may not be able to exploit potential optimisations available within the target model
checker. It should be noted, however, that some well-known optimisation techniques,
such as partial order reduction, are implemented in JPF and so are applied during the
model generation phase, hence the Kripke structure is already in an optimised form.
4 Exporting AJPF Models to SPIN
In this section we describe the detailed process used to translate AJPF models to
PROMELA for verification in the SPIN model-checker, and some results of SPIN ver-
ification of the PROMELA models generated.
4.1 Translation Details
Both SPIN and AJPF’s LTL algorithm operate on similar automaton structures so
translating between the two is straightforward. In AJPF a model can be viewed as a
set of model states, ms, which are a tuple of an integer, i, and a set of propositions, P .
The model itself includes a function, F , that maps an integer (representing a particular
model state) to a set of integers (representing all the model states which can be reached
in one transition). In this way the model describes a graph.
Since, within AJPF’s NatJVM, each state is assigned a number, e.g, 12. This is
converted to state12 in the SPIN input file. Then the list of propositional objects
is examined recursively. Each proposition is converted into a simple string (without
spaces or brackets), and assigned either the value true or false, depending upon its value
in the state. PROMELA represents the transitions between states as goto statements
attached to states.
The process of translating these models into PROMELA is straightforward:
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States:
0: B(ag1,bad()) = false;
1: B(ag1,bad()) = false;
2: B(ag1,bad()) = false;
Edges:
0-->1
1-->2
bool bag1bad;
active proctype JPFModel() {
state0: bag1bad = false;
goto state1;
state1: bag1bad = false;
goto state2;
state2:bag1bad = false;
printf("end state\n");
}
Figure 3: Equivalent program models in AJPF (left) and PROMELA (right)
1. First we initialise the model: we convert all the properties in the model to strings
(as described above) and print these as a list of boolean variables (“bool”).
2. Print active proctype JPFModel() {.
3. We then iterate through the states in the AJPF model. For each state we carry
out the following:
(a) Print out statenum: where num is the state number.
(b) Iterate over all the propositions printing props = true or props = false
as appropriate (where props is the string representing the proposition).
(c) If there is more than one edge print if.
(d) Iterate over all the state’s outgoing edges, print goto statenum; where
num is the number of the next state.
(e) If there is more than one edge print fi;
(f) If there are no outgoing edges print printf("end state\n").
4. Print }.
Figure 3 shows the NatJVM model of a simple agent program with one property (agent
1 believes the proposition “bad”) compared to the result of exporting this model in
PROMELA.
4.2 Results
We tested our SPIN implementation on the verification of a simple “leader” agent
intended to coordinate a formation of satellites as described in [22]. This program was
implemented in a version of the GWENDOLEN BDI language [5]. We implemented
a non-deterministic environment for the agent in which messages from the satellite
agents could randomly arrive each time the agent took an action. This caused model-
checking to explore all possible combinations of messages that the leader agent could
receive. The agent was designed to assign positions to four satellites and then wait
for responses. Since our hypothesis was that we would see gains in performance as
the LTL property to be checked became more complex we tested the system against a
sequence of properties:
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1. ¬Blead bad
(The lead agent never believes something bad has happened).
2. ((Blead informed(ag1)→ ♦Bleadmaintaining pos(ag1)))→ ¬Blead bad
(If it is always the case that when the leader has informed agent 1 of its position
then eventually the leader will believe agent 1 is maintaining that position, then it
is always the case that the leader does not believe something bad has happened).
The next three properties increase in complexity by adding subformulae for agents ag2,
ag3 and ag4. The final property adds another subformula which says that it is always
the case that if the leader believes that the formation is in the shape of a square, then
eventually it believes that it has informed agent ag1 of this.
3. ((Blead informed(ag2) → ♦Bleadmaintaining pos(ag2))) ∧
(Blead informed(ag1)→ ♦Bleadmaintaining pos(ag1)))→ ¬Blead bad
4. ((Blead informed(ag3) → ♦Bleadmaintaining pos(ag3)) ∧
(Blead informed(ag2)→ ♦Bleadmaintaining pos(ag2)) ∧
(Blead informed(ag1)→ ♦Bleadmaintaining pos(ag1)))→ ¬Blead bad
5. ((Blead informed(ag4) → ♦Bleadmaintaining pos(ag4)) ∧
(Blead informed(ag3) → ♦Bleadmaintaining pos(ag3)) ∧
(Blead informed(ag2)→ ♦Bleadmaintaining pos(ag2)) ∧
(Blead informed(ag1)→ ♦Bleadmaintaining pos(ag1)))→ ¬Blead bad
6. ((Blead informed(ag4) → ♦Bleadmaintaining pos(ag4)) ∧
(Blead informed(ag3) → ♦Bleadmaintaining pos(ag3)) ∧
(Blead informed(ag2) → ♦Bleadmaintaining pos(ag2)) ∧
(Blead informed(ag1) → ♦Bleadmaintaining pos(ag1))) ∧
(Blead formation(square)→ ♦Blead informed(ag1)))→ ¬Blead bad
This sequence of increasingly complex properties was constructed so that each property
had the form P1∧ . . .∧Pn → Q for some n ≥ 0 and each Pi was of the form ((P ′i →
♦Qi)). With the addition of each such logical antecedent the property automata became
considerably more complex. Furthermore, the antecedents were chosen so that we were
confident that on at least some paths through the program P ′i would be true at some
point, necessitating that the LTL checker explore the product automata for ♦Qi. We
judged that this sequence of properties provided a good test for the way each model-
checker’s performance scaled as the property under test became more complicated.
SPIN model-checking requires a sequence of steps to be undertaken: the LTL prop-
erty must be translated to a “never claim” (effectively representing the automaton cor-
responding to the negation of the required property), then it is compiled together with
the PROMELA description into C, which is then compiled again before being run as a
C program. We used the LTL3BA tool [1] to compile the LTL property into a never
claim since this is more efficient than the built-in SPIN compiler. In our results we
present the total time taken for all SPIN operations (SPIN Time) and the total time
taken overall including generation of the model in AJPF.
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Property AJPF AJPF + SPIN
Time Memory AJPF Time Memory SPIN Time Total Time
1 11m20s 413MB 11m17s 413MB 4s 11m21s
2 13m09s 410MB 13m04s 410MB 5s 13m09s
3 15m27s 410MB 15m30s 410MB 7s 15m37s
4 18m19s 408MB 18m18s 411MB 11s 18m29s
5 22m14s 411MB 21m54s 417MB 16s 22m10s
6 — — 22m3s 406MB 24s 22m27s
Table 1: Comparing AJPF with and without SPIN model checking.
Table 1 shows the running times for model-checking the six properties on a 2.8
GHz Intel Core i7 Macbook running MacOS 10.7.4 with 8 GB of memory. There is no
result for AJPF model-checking of the final property since the system suffered a stack
overflow error when attempting to build the property automata.
The results show that as the LTL property becomes more complex, model-checking
using the AJPF to PROMELA/SPIN translation tool is marginally less efficient than
using AJPF alone. It should be noted that, in the SPIN case, where AJPF is not per-
forming LTL model-checking, and is using a simple list of propositions (rather than an
LTL property) the time to generate the model still increases as the property becomes
more complex. This is explained by the overhead involved in tracking the proposition
objects in the JPFJVM and the NatJVM: as more propositions are involved this time in-
creases. In fact it is clear that the number of propositions are the major factor affecting
the efficiency of the model checking – not the complexity of the temporal expressions
within the property itself. Given that the SPIN version has additional overheads (the
model needs to be written to a file and then SPIN itself needs to be run) the overall time
taken to model check tends to be slower, even if the time taken to build the model is
faster. If, however, a model is to be generated once and then checked against a number
of properties then using SPIN together with AJPF is clearly preferable.
It is interesting to note that AJPF could not generate a property automaton for
property 6. Indeed, this is a compelling argument that combining AJPF with SPIN
or some other model-checker is sometimes necessary. It also illustrates the point that
SPIN is optimised for working with LTL where AJPF is not.
5 Exporting AJPF Models to PRISM
This section describes the translation of AJPF models to PRISM’s input language.
5.1 Translation Details
Both AJPF’s NatJVM and SPIN operate on Kripke structures so it was a straightfor-
ward process to translate between them. However, the PRISM input language is based
on probabilistic timed automata, structures that are commonly used to model systems
that exhibit both timed and probabilistic behaviour, such as network protocols, sensors,
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public class Choice<O extends Object> {
public Ar rayL i s t<Option<O>> c h o i c e l i s t = new Ar rayL i s t<Option<O>>();
public double t h i s c h o i c e p r o b a b i l i t y ;
public Random r = new Random ( ) ;
/ / Pick a choice according to a p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n
public O choose ( ) {
i n t i = pickChoice ( c h o i c e l i s t . s i ze ( ) − 1 ) ;
t h i s c h o i c e = c h o i c e l i s t . get ( i ) . getProb ( ) ;
O choice = c h o i c e l i s t . get ( i ) . getObj ( ) ;
return choice ;
}
/ / p ickChoice performs r o u l e t t e wheel se l e c t i on over the choices
/ / i t r e tu rns an i n t and takes an i n t as a parameter i n order to
/ / s imp l i f y i n t e r a c t i o n s wi th the Nat ive JVM.
public in t pickChoice ( i n t l i m i t ) {
double r va lue = r . nextDouble ( ) ;
i n t l i s t i n d e x = 0;
Option<O> cu r ren t = c h o i c e l i s t . get ( l i s t i n d e x ) ;
double accumulator = cu r ren t . getProb ( ) ;
while ( r va lue > accumulator ) {
l i s t i n d e x ++;
i f ( l i s t i n d e x == l i m i t ) { break ; }
cu r ren t = c h o i c e l i s t . get ( l i s t i n d e x ) ;
accumulator += cu r ren t . getProb ( ) ;
}
return l i s t i n d e x ;
}
/ / The Option Class represen t ing a tup l e o f a p r o b a b i l i t y and
/ / the value assoc iated wi th i t .
public class Option<O1 extends Object> {
public double p r o b a b i l i t y ;
public O1 value ;
public double getProb ( ) { return p r o b a b i l i t y ; }
public O1 getObj ( ) { return value ; }
}
}
Figure 4: The Choice Class (Simplified)
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biological models, etc. While we do not utilise the timing dimension here, the proba-
bilistic aspect is important. The key difference between the automata considered earlier
and their probabilistic counterparts is that transitions between states are now proba-
bilistic. Specifically, such automata typically incorporate a probability distribution to
inform the choice amongst the potential transitions [21]. Consequently, information
about this probability distribution is important in constructing probabilistic automata.
In order to support transitions with probability labels, it was necessary to make
some alterations to AJPF. JPF, and hence AJPF, is able to branch the search space
when a random element is selected from a finite set. However the system does not
record the probabilities of each branch created in a manner accessible to the NatJVM.
In order to address this we made use of a JPF customisation tool known as a native
peer. The native peer of a Java object can intercept the execution of particular methods
associated with the object. When a method is intercepted, alternative code associated
with the native peer is executed in the NatJVM instead of the existing code associ-
ated with the object. This can allow complex algorithms to be executed natively for
efficiency reasons or, as is the case here, to control branching in the program model.
We developed a new class, Choice, in Java which represented a probabilistic
choice from a finite set of options. We also developed a native peer for this class.
A Choice object consists of an array of Options. An Option is a tuple com-
prising both a probability and a value (of whatever class is needed for the results of
the choice). The probabilities of the options in the array add up to one (at least in
theory). At a high level, when asked to pick a choice the class returns one of the op-
tions from the array. When not executing in JPF, the class selects the option by using
a standard “roulette wheel” algorithm to select an option according to the probability
distribution. When executing in JPF, the method that performs roulette wheel selection
is intercepted and, instead, a choice generator is created. This sets a backtrack point
in the system and each time the execution returns to that backtrack point a different
option is selected until all choices have been explored. The Choice class maintains,
as a field, the probability of the current choice allowing this to be accessed by the AJPF
Listener and used to annotate the edges of the model.
Figure 4 shows a simplified version of the Java code for the Choice and Option
classes. When asked to pick a choice, the class calls first its choose method, which in
turn calls the pickChoice method. pickChoice returns an index to the Option
array. choose then selects the relevant option from the array and returns it to the
rest of the program. We used a two stage process because it allowed us to deal just
with primitive datatypes in the pickChoice method (which made programming the
native peer considerably simpler). When not executing in JPF, pickChoice uses a
roulette wheel algorithm to select an option. When the choose method is invoked
outside AJPF, therefore, the effect is to randomly return one of the values from the list
according to the distribution specified. Once pickChoice has returned a value, then
choose updates the field, thischoice probability, with the current probabil-
ity and returns the relevant option to the program.
We cannot use the generation of a random double-precision floating point number
to branch the search space in JPF since there are 264 choices and the search space would
increase in size considerably. Instead, we branch the search space with one branch for
each of the possible options in the Choice class. This is done by using a native peer
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for the Choice class a (very simplified) version of which is shown in Figure 5. When
running in JPF, the native peer intercepts calls to pickChoice and creates a choice
generator (a branch point in the program automaton) with one branch for each index
to the Option array. The version of pickChoice in the JPFJVM is not executed
and instead the version in the native peer is used. Each branch of the choice generator
returns a different index to the Option array. In this way the exploration of successive
branches causes every index to be returned to the choose method.
public class J P F a j p f u t i l C h o i c e<O extends Object> extends NativePeer {
public s ta t i c in t pickChoice ( MJIEnv env , i n t ob j r e f , i n t l i m i t ) {
i n t myChoice = 0;
i f ( i s F i r s t S t e p I n s n ( ) ) {
log . f i n e ( ” c rea t i ng a choice generator ” ) ;
. . .
} else {
IntChoiceFromSet cg =
getCurrentChoiceGenerator ( ” p r o b a b i l i s t i c C h o i c e ” ,
IntChoiceFromSet . class ) ;
myChoice = cg . getNextChoice ( ) ;
}
return myChoice ;
}
}
Figure 5: (Simplified) Native Peer for the Choice Class
In AJPF, a specialised Probability Listener, executing in the NatJVM, listens for
invocations of the choose method. The listener does not replace the code in choose
but acquires a reference to the Choice object itself and after execution of the method
completes, it can access the value stored in thischoice probability. This al-
lows the Listener in the NatJVM to annotate the edge created in the model by the choice
generator with the appropriate probability, thus annotating the relevant branch with the
probability of taking that transition. Similar specialised Listeners could be used to an-
notate branches with other information (e.g., actions, time estimates) were the system
to be adapted for use with other more expressive model-checking systems.
In short, programming with the Choice class, in the normal execution of the pro-
gram, simply picks an element from a set based on some probability distribution. When
executed within AJPF, the Choice class causes the system to explore all possible
choices and label each branch with its probability.
5.2 Translation to PRISM
After this, the process of translating these models into PRISM’s input language is
straightforward.
1. First we initialise the model. We set it as a discrete time Markov chain (dtmc),
list the numbers of all states and state the initial state (0), and list all the propo-
sitions in the property and initialise them to false.
2. We then iterate through the states in the AJPF model. For each state we:
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(a) Print out state = num where num is the state number, followed by
“->”.
(b) Iterate over all its outgoing edges. For each edge, we:
i. Print out the probability of that edge being traversed.
ii. Print out the state number and the values of the propositions in the
property for the resulting state.
5.3 Case Studies
5.3.1 A Simple Unmanned Aircraft
As an example we consider a simple program based on [30] in which an autonomous
unmanned aircraft (UA) must detect and avoid potential collisions. The unmanned air-
craft’s radar is only 90% reliable, so it does not always perform an ‘evade’ maneouvre
when a collision is possible. The agent controlling the unmanned aircraft is imple-
mented in GWENDOLEN which does not contain any probabilistic aspects. However
the agent was executed within an environment model programmed in Java where the
Choice class was used to represent the unreliability of the sensor when the agent
requested incoming perceptions8. The code for this simple unmanned aircraft can be
found in Appendix B.
The model is tracking two predicates: P(collision), which means a potential col-
lision is perceptible in the environment, and Auaevade, which means the last action
performed was the unmanned aircraft agent taking an evade maneouvre. In the con-
struction of a Java environment to be used by an AIL it is necessary to provide a set of
percepts. These form a list of predicates that are theoretically perceptible. Precisely be-
cause we wish to explore issues of an agent failing to perceive something, the property
specification language allows these to be referred to separately from internal ‘mental’
states of the agent. In this instance P(collision) can be interpreted as meaning that
in the environment a collision is going to occur irrespective of whether the agent has
perceived this fact. This allows us to describe properties that capture the potential un-
reliability of sensors. The agent was programmed to make ‘evade’ maneouvres when
it believed there would be a collision. It only believed there would be a collision if a
collision was perceptible and the sensor conveyed that information to the agent.
A fragment of the AJPF model for this program, adapted to show the probability
of transitions is shown in Figure 6 alongside the full model exported in the PRISM
input language9. Figure 7 provides a brief outline of some key features of PRISM’s
property specification language, a fragment of PCTL [12]. Its full semantics can be
found in [24].
We model-checked the above program in PRISM against the property
P=?(P(collision)→ ♦Auaevade)
8We would also be able to investigate properties of BDI programming languages with probabilistic fea-
tures, providing their AIL implementation used the Choice class — see Section 6.1.
9Note that the nature of rounding in Java means that 0.1 is, in several places, represented as
0.09999999999999998.
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AJPF Model
States:
3: A(ua,evade()) = false;
P(collision()) = false;
4: A(ua,evade()) = false;
P(collision()) = true;
5: A(ua,evade()) = false;
P(collision()) = true;
6: A(ua,evade()) = true;
P(collision()) = false;
7: A(ua,evade()) = true;
P(collision()) = false;
...
Edges:
0.9 ::: 3-->4
0.09999999999999998 ::: 3-->11
1.0 ::: 4-->5
1.0 ::: 5-->6
...
PRISM Model
dtmc
module jpfModel
state : [0 ..15] init 0;
auaevade: bool init false;
pcollision: bool init false;
[] state = 2 -> 1.0:(state’=3) & (auaevade’= false) & (pcollision’= false);
[] state = 3 -> 0.9:(state’=4) & (auaevade’= false) & (pcollision’= true)
+ 0.09999999999999998:(state’=11) & (auaevade’= false) & (pcollision’= true);
[] state = 4 -> 1.0:(state’=5) & (auaevade’= false) & (pcollision’= true);
[] state = 5 -> 1.0:(state’=6) & (auaevade’= false) & (pcollision’= true);
[] state = 6 -> 1.0:(state’=7) & (auaevade’= true) & (pcollision’= false);
...
endmodule
Figure 6: Comparison of Models for AJPF and PRISM
The syntax of the fragment of the PRISM property specification language rel-
evant here is given by the following grammar:
φ ::= true | a | φ ∧ φ | ¬φ | P./p[ψ]
ψ ::= ©φ | φU≤kφ | φUφ
where a is an atomic proposition, ./∈ {≤, <,≥, >}, p ∈ Q≥0, and k ∈ N.
The semantics of the propositional logic statements and the CTL until oper-
ator are standard and allow  (always) and ♦ (eventually) to be defined (see
Appendix D). P is a probabilistic operator and indicates the probability that
some property is true along all paths from some state s where the operator is
evaluated. For instance P≥0.98ψ evaluated at state s means “the probability
that ψ is satisfied by the paths from state s is greater than 0.98”.
It is also possible to take a quantitative approach so P=?ψ will return a value
for the probability that ψ is satisfied for all paths from state s.
Figure 7: The PRISM Property Specification language
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to establish that the probability that the unmanned aircraft would evade a collision, if
one were possible, was 90%.
For comparison purposes we also model-checked the program in AJPF. Since AJPF
does not support probabilistic reasoning we checked a different property:
Bua collision→ ♦Auaevade (1)
i.e., that if the UA came to believe there would be a collision then it would eventually
make an evade maneuver.
AJPF AJPF outputing to PRISM
Time Memory Time Memory
3s 229MB 3s 360MB
PRISM itself, then took 1.8s to build and check a model from the file produced by
AJPF.
5.3.2 A More Complex Unmanned Aircraft
The BDI agent program described in the previous section is quite basic: the BDI agent
in control of the autonomous unmanned aircraft can only perform “cruise” and “detec-
t/avoid” manoeuvres. In order to test the capabilities of the AJPF to PRISM translator,
and to validate the PRISM models it generates, we used a more complex BDI agent pro-
gram based on work described in [30]. The program described in Section 5.3.1 has one
agent, UA (the autonomous unmanned aircraft’s decision-making system), consisting
of three GWENDOLEN plans (see Appendix B). The program described here contains
two agents (one for the UA and one for an Air Traffic Control system — ATC) and a
total of 22 plans divided between the two agents (see Appendix C).
In this more complex BDI agent program the unmanned aircraft begins on the
ground (the airport ramp) at the start of its mission. The UA agent then requests clear-
ance to taxi from the ATC agent. Clearance is either given or denied. If it is denied,
the UA will repeatedly ask for taxi clearance until it receives permission to taxi. When
the UA receives taxi clearance it directs the unmanned aircraft into the runway hold-
ing position, a position to the side of the runway where the aircraft waits until it has
clearance from the ATC agent to manoeuvre onto the runway itself. Once in the run-
way holding position the UA will request permission to manoeuvre onto the runway
(“line up”). Once clearance is given the unmanned aircraft manoeuvres onto the run-
way where it lines up ready for take-off. Once again, the UA requests clearance from
air traffic control, this time to take-off. When take-off clearance is given, the UA agent
directs the unmanned aircraft to take-off. Once in flight the UA may receive messages
from a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensor system on-board the unmanned aircraft,
which is modelled within a Java class representing the UA agent’s environment. If the
sensor detects that there is another aircraft approaching on a collision course, it informs
the UA via a percept, ‘collision’, that the unmanned aircraft is on a collision course.
Upon receiving this percept the UA directs the unmanned aircraft to perform an eva-
sive manoeuvre using the action ‘evade’. Finally, the UA will land when the navigation
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subsystem (again, modelled within the Java class representing the UA agent’s environ-
ment) indicates the destination has been reached by adding a percept, ‘landing’. The
full GWENDOLEN code for this example can be seen in Appendix C.
In this example the sensor is given an accuracy of 90%, which means that if there is
another aircraft on a collision course, then the sensor will accurately determine that this
is the case with a probability of 0.9. We were able to use the PRISM model generated
by AJPF to determine that the following probability was, indeed, 0.9:
P=?¬(♦(P(collision) ∧ ¬(♦Auaevade)))
This property expresses the probability that it is never the case that the possibility of
collision is perceptible yet the UA fails to take evasive action. In other words, there
is a probability of 0.9 of the UA taking evasive action, which we would expect as the
environment model contains a faulty sensor which has an accuracy of 90%.
We can also verify the following property:
P=?(♦(P(collision) ∧ ¬(♦Auaevade)))
This property expresses the probability that it is always the case that the possibility of
collision is perceptible yet the UA fails to take evasive action. PRISM calculates this
probability to be 0.1, as would be expected by inspection of the model.
Therefore, these results validate the accuracy of the PRISM model generated from
AJPF and verified using PRISM, at least for these properties.
5.3.3 Computational Resources
In Section 4.2 we compared the time taken by AJPF to verify a set of properties using
(i) the JPF model checker, and (ii) the SPIN model checker. We were able to compare
these timings as AJPF and SPIN were working on the same Kripke structure of the
agent program and the outputs of both model checkers were a simple Boolean value in-
dicating the presence of an error in the model. PRISM, in contrast to SPIN and AJPF,
uses probabilistic timed automata instead of Kripke structures and returns a probability
for each property verified.10 Therefore it is not possible to compare JPF’s performance
to PRISM’s performance, as both model checkers are fundamentally different, and JPF
cannot be used to verify probabilistic models. However, we can compare the computa-
tional resources used by the two case studies presented in this section: the simple UA
and the more complex UA. The computational resources used were as follows:
Generation (AJPF) Verification (PRISM)
Model States Time (s) Memory (MB) Time (s) Memory (MB)
Simple UA 16 1 235 1.3 0.24
Complex UA 42 3 427 1.3 0.24
Complex UA 2 98 6 486 1.3 0.26
Complex UA 3 200 10 486 1.3 0.28
Complex UA 4 408 19 488 1.3 0.31
10It should be noted that it is possible to use PRISM as a non-probabilistic model checker when using
non-probabilistic models. It is also possible to receive a Boolean value as output, e.g., when checking that a
resulting probability is within a certain range. However, the typical use of PRISM is to discover probabilities
associated with probabilistic models.
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Figure 8: Time and memory resources used by AJPF for the generation of PRISM
models.
These results are summarised in Figures 8 and 9. In addition to the simple and com-
plex UA examples given earlier, we tested three further agent programs (“Complex UA
[2-4]”). These models were extensions of the Complex UA agent program designed
to increase the number of states required for model-checking. These modifications
consisted of additional interactions with the agent’s environment at the start of its ex-
ecution. These results were obtained using an 8-core Intel Core i7-3720QM 2.60GHz
CPU laptop with 16 GB of memory running 64-bit Ubuntu Linux 12.04 LTS.
In the table above, and in Figures 8 and 9, “States” refers to the number of states
generated by AJPF and used in the PRISM model. The time and memory used for gen-
eration of the PRISM models by AJPF is shown under “Generation” and in Figure 8.
The time and memory used for verification is shown under “Verification” and in Fig-
ure 9. It can be seen in Figure 8 that the amount of time used by AJPF to generate the
models increases approximately linearly with the number of states. The memory used
by AJPF for generation increased rapidly at first, but then levelled out, in line with
typical AJPF usage. It can be seen in Figure 9 that the time used by PRISM during ver-
ification was constant11, but the memory used increased with the number of states in
an approximately linear fashion. However, the amount of memory used was minimal:
in all cases less that 0.4 MB. PRISM’s minimal overheads are not surprising given that
it is an efficient symbolic model checker and therefore any time and memory used for
such simple models should be similar.
In Section 4.2 we compared the efficiency of using AJPF with SPIN to using AJPF
alone. In the case of PRISM verification, we cannot report a similar result as we could
not compare verification times between (i) AJPF, and (ii) AJPF with PRISM, as AJPF
does not support probabilistic model-checking. However, as in section 5.3.1, we could
verify the program in AJPF alone against a similar but non-probabilistic property, (1)
(see page 18). We show the time and memory consumption for this verification below.
11This is because the bulk of the time, when considering small models (i.e., those with a few hundred
states) is taken up by system overheads which are the same for all runs.
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Figure 9: Time and memory resources used by PRISM for the verification of models
generated by AJPF.
Model States Time (s) Memory (MB)
Simple UA 4 1 235
Complex UA 33 3 235
Complex UA 2 81 4 297
Complex UA 3 167 7 429
Complex UA 4 343 13 305
However, clearly the advantage in using AJPF with PRISM over AJPF alone is pre-
cisely when we wish to verify properties that can not be expressed in AJPF; exporting
models of agent programs from AJPF enables them to be model checked using prob-
abilistic model checkers like PRISM. In principle it should be possible to export agent
programs for other types of model checkers in order to model check agent programs in
other ways. For instance, it may be possible to use AJPF to generate real-time agent
program models (from a language such as AgentSpeak(RT) [28]) that could be model
checked using a real-time model checker like UPPAAL [2]. Of course, this would de-
pend on a real-time agent programming language interpreter being implemented using
the AIL (see Section 2.1).
6 Conclusion
We have shown how AJPF can be used to generate models of BDI agent programs
for formal verification using other model checkers in a two-step process. This work
generalises the work of Hunter et. al [16], in which JPF was used to generate models
of Brahms programs for model-checking using SPIN. The work described in the paper
provides a generic tool for producing models of agent programs implemented in a wide
range of BDI languages. These models can then be exported into the input languages
of the model-checker of choice; the SPIN and PRISM model-checkers are used as
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examples in this paper. Where such a model-checker operates on Kripke structures
there is a direct translation from AJPF’s own internal model to that of the target model-
checker. For model-checkers using richer input structures it is still relatively easy, using
the customisation options available with JPF, to enrich AJPF’s models so that they can
be exported appropriately. We provided an example of one such adaptation allowing
BDI programs to be probabilistically model-checked via the PRISM model-checker.
In both cases, this provides a viable, two-stage route to more flexible agent program
verification.
6.1 Further Work
One of our primary motivations in performing this work was to enable the probabilistic
model-checking of BDI agents, particularly in practical healthcare and hybrid systems
scenarios. We intend therefore to explore more sophisticated and realistic examples in
which an implemented BDI based agent program is executed in AJPF and then model-
checked in PRISM. The aim is to produce results about the overall reliability of systems
based on probabilistic analyses of systems with sensors of varying reliability.
We are also interested in exploring the verification of multi-agent properties in-
volving strategies. This would involve both adapting our output format for an ATL
model-checker, such as MCMAS [23], and adapting the internal models so that tran-
sitions are labelled with actions. We may also wish to extend the AIL so that agents
can explicitly reason about their own strategies. We would also like to investigate BDI
programming languages that incorporate probabilistic features, something which will
likely require that their AIL implementation uses the Choice class.
It would be possible to adapt AJPF to save and then re-import its own models,
avoiding the model generation bottleneck while retaining the entire verification process
within a single system. While this would lose some of the benefits (e.g., assurance and
efficiency), it would provide a simpler tool and might be more attractive in certification
situations.
Finally, we aim to assess (and, hence, optimise) the model extraction process to
(a) be as streamlined as possible, (b) produce structures that can potentially still take
advantage of symbolic encodings in target model checkers, and (c) carry out simple
abstractions, where appropriate. We will also explore the limits of this technique by
identifying classes of programs that generate structures that are too complex to be
verified using particular target model checkers.
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A The AJPF Property Specification Language
AJPF Property Specification Language Syntax The syntax for property formulæ
φ is as follows, where ag is an “agent constant” referring to a specific agent in the
system, and f is a ground first-order atomic formula:
φ ::= Bag f | Gagf | Aagf | Iagf | P(f) | φ ∨ φ | ¬φ | φ Uφ | φRφ
Here, Bag f is true if ag believes f to be true, Gagf is true if ag has a goal to make f
true, and so on (with A representing actions, I representing intentions, and P repre-
senting percepts, i.e., properties that are true in the environment).
AJPF Property Specification Language Semantics We summarise those aspects
of the semantics of property formulæ relevant to this paper. Consider a program, P ,
describing a multi-agent system and let MAS be the state of the multi-agent system at
one point in the run of P . MAS is a tuple consisting of the local states of the individual
agents and of the environment. Let ag ∈ MAS be the state of an agent in the MAS
tuple at this point in the program execution. Then
MAS |=MC Bag f iff ag |= Bag f
where |= is logical consequence as implemented by the agent programming language.
The semantics of Gagf and Iagf similarly refer to internal implementations of the
language interpreter. The interpretation of Aagf is:
MAS |=MC Aagf
if, and only if, the last action changing the environment was action f taken by agent
ag. Finally, the interpretation of P(f) is given as:
MAS |=MC P(f)
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if, and only if, f is a percept that holds true in the environment.
The other operators in the AJPF property specification language have standard PLTL
semantics [8] and are implemented as Bu¨chi Automata as described in [10, 4]. Thus,
the classical logic operators are defined by:
MAS |=MC ϕ ∨ ψ iff MAS |=MC ϕ or MAS |=MC ψ
MAS |=MC ¬φ iff MAS 6|=MC φ.
The temporal formulæ apply to runs of the programs in the JPF model checker. A run
consists of a (possibly infinite) sequence of program states MAS i, i ≥ 0 where MAS 0
is the initial state of the program (note, however, that for model checking the number
of different states in any run is assumed to be finite). Let P be a multi-agent program,
then:
MAS |=MC ϕ Uψ iff in all runs of P there exists a state MAS j
such that MAS i |=MC ϕ for all 0 ≤ i < j
and MAS j |=MC ψ.
MAS |=MC ϕRψ iff either MAS i |=MC ϕ for all i or there
exists MAS j such that MAS i |=MC ϕ
for all 0 ≤ i ≤ j and MAS j |=MC ϕ ∧ ψ.
The common temporal operators ♦ (eventually) and  (always) are, in turn, derivable
from U andR in the usual way [8].
B Simple Unmanned Aircraft Code
Syntax. GWENDOLEN uses many syntactic conventions from BDI agent languages:
+!g indicates the addition of the goal g; +b indicates the addition of the belief b; while
−b indicates the removal of the belief. Plans then consist of three parts, with the pattern
trigger : guard← body;
The ‘ trigger ’ is typically the addition of a goal or a belief (beliefs may be acquired
thanks to the operation of perception and as a result of internal deliberation); the ‘guard’
states conditions about the agent’s beliefs (and, potentially, goals) which must be true
before the plan can become active; and the ‘body’ is a stack of ‘deeds’ the agent per-
forms in order to execute the plan. These deeds typically involve the addition and
deletion of goals and beliefs as well as actions (e.g., evade) which refer to code that is
delegated to non-rational parts of the systems.
The GWENDOLEN code for the simple unmanned aircraft case study is as follows:
1:name: ua
2: Initial Goals:
3fly [perform]
4:Plans:
5+! fly [perform]: {>} ← +airborne;
6+airborne: {>} ← normal, +normalFlight, +direction ( straight ) ;
7+ collision : {B airborne} ← evade;
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C More Complex Unmanned Aircraft Code
The GWENDOLEN code for the more complex unmanned aircraft case study is as fol-
lows:
1:name: ua
2: Initial Beliefs:
3waitingAtRamp
4vicinityOfAerodrome
5: Initial Goals:
6fly [perform]
7:Plans:
8+.received(: tell , B): {>} ← +B;
9+! fly [perform]: {B waitingAtRamp} ← .send(atc, :tell , requestingTaxiClearance);
10+taxiClearanceDenied: {B waitingAtRamp} ← .send(atc, :tell, requestingTaxiClearance);
11+taxiClearanceGiven: {B waitingAtRamp} ←−waitingAtRamp, +taxyingToRunwayHoldPosition;
12+taxyingToRunwayHoldPosition: {>} ←−taxyingToRunwayHoldPosition, +holdingOnRunway;
13+holdingOnRunway: {>} ← .send(atc, :tell, requestingLineUpClearance);
14+lineUpClearanceGiven: {>} ←−holdingOnRunway, +linedUpOnRunway;
15+linedUpOnRunway: {>} ← .send(atc, :tell, requestingTakeOffClearance);
16+takeOffClearanceGiven: {>} ←−linedUpOnRunway, +takingOff;
17+takingOff: {>} ← take off , +airborne;
18+airborne: {>} ← +normalFlight, normal, +direction( straight ) ;
19+ collision : {B normalFlight, B direction (Dir)} ← −normalFlight,
20+oldstate(normalFlight),
21+olddir (Dir) ,
22+EmergencyAvoid,
23−direction(Dir) , +direction ( right ) , evade;
24+ collision : {B changingHeading, B direction(Dir)} ←−changingHeading,
25+oldstate(changingHeading),
26+olddir (Dir) ,
27+EmergencyAvoid,
28−direction(Dir) , +direction ( right ) , evade;
29+changeHeading: {B normalFlight, ˜B toldOtherwise, B vicinityOfAerodrome} ←−normalFlight,
+changingHeading, +direction(left);
30+landing: {>} ← land;
31+headingOK: {B changingHeading, B direction(Dir)} ←−changingHeading, +normalFlight,
−direction(Dir), +direction(straight);
32+objectPassed: {B emergencyAvoid, B oldstate(State), B olddir(Dir), B direction (D2)} ←
−emergencyAvoid, −oldstate(State), +State, −olddir(Dir), −direction(D2), +direction(Dir) ;
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34:name: atc
35: Initial Beliefs:
36: Initial Goals:
37:Plans:
38+.received(: tell , B): {>} ← +B;
39+requestingTaxiClearance: {>} ← .send(ua, : tell , taxiClearanceGiven);
40+requestingTaxiClearance: {>} ← .send(ua, : tell , taxiClearanceDenied);
41+requestingLineUpClearance: {>} ← .send(ua, : tell , lineUpClearanceGiven);
42+requestingTakeOffClearance: {>} ← .send(ua, : tell , takeOffClearanceGiven);
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D Syntax and Semantics of Temporal Logics
The syntax of Linear Temporal Logic is
φ ::= true | false | p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ
ψ ::= ©φ | φUφ
Where p ∈ Σ such that Σ is a countable set of propositions.
Temporal formulae are interpreted over a discrete, linear model of time, M with
an interpretation function, I : N → 2Σ which maps each point in time (represented as
a natural number) to a set of propositions.
〈M, i〉 |= p iff p ∈ I(i) (2)
〈M, i〉 |= ¬φ iff 〈M, i〉 6|= φ (3)
〈M, i〉 |= φ ∧ ψ iff 〈M, i〉 |= φ and 〈M, i〉 |= ψ (4)
〈M, i〉 |= ©φ iff 〈M, i+ 1〉 |= φ (5)
〈M, i〉 |= φUψ iff ∃j ≥ i. 〈M, j〉 |= ψ and ∀i ≤ k ≤ j. 〈M, k〉 |= φ (6)
The syntax of probabilistic branching time logic, PCTL, is
φ ::= true | a | φ ∧ φ | ¬φ | P./p[ψ]
ψ ::= ©φ | φU≤kφ | φUφ
where a is an atomic proposition, ./∈ {≤, <,≥, >}, p ∈ Q≥0, and k ∈ N.
We interpret PCTL formulae over discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs) which
capture a probabilistic branching model of time. Instead of evaluating a formula at a
particular time point i as we did for LTL, we evaluate for a state s. Paths, pi, through
the DTMC are sequences of states s0(a1, µ1)s1(a2, µ2)s2 . . ., where ai is the ith ac-
tion taken to transform state si−1 into state si and µi is the probability of that action
occurring. Paths(s) is the set of all paths that start in state s. The probability of a path,
pi is the product of the probability that each state in pi transitions to the next state in pi.
The probability of a set of paths, Pr , is the sum of the probability of each individual
path.
〈M, s〉 |= p iff p ∈ I(s) (7)
〈M, s〉 |= ¬φ iff 〈M, s〉 6|= φ (8)
〈M, s〉 |= φ ∧ ψ iff 〈M, s〉 |= φ and 〈M, s〉 |= ψ (9)
〈M, pi〉 |= ©φ iff 〈M, s1〉 |= φ (10)
〈M, ω〉 |= φU≤kψ iff ∃i ≤ k. 〈M, si〉 |= ψ and ∀j < i. 〈M, sj〉 |= φ (11)
〈M, pi〉 |= φUψ iff ∃k ≥ 0. 〈M, pi〉 |= φU≤kψ (12)
〈M, s〉 |= P./p[ψ] iff Pr({pi ∈ Paths(s) | 〈M, pi〉 |= ψ}) ./ p (13)
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